Friday, March 20, 2009

Grace as the Way Into God

Eugene F. Rogers, Sexuality and the Christian Body: Their Way Into the Triune God (Challenges in Contemporary Theology). Wiley-Blackwell Publishing (1999).

Rogers brings an approach that manages to be simultaneously conservative and traditional, and liberated—not to say liberal—to the question of sexuality in the Christian church. In the process, he makes convincing and fascinating critiques of much Christian theology that, while I do not have the expertise to assess them fully, feel correct, and make a lot of sense. And his conclusions are beautiful and, again, simply look and feel true.

Rogers has to deal with the text of the Bible. The Old Testament mentions homosexuality twice. At Leviticus 18:22 it says: “Do not lie with a man as one lies with a woman; that is detestable.” It prescribes the penalty of banishment. Later, in Leviticus 20:13, the text uses substantially the same language, except this time it prescribes death for both partners.

Once we get over the fact that even the very same book of the Bible seems a little confused about the issue, the question is, do these prohibitions carry through? After all, the sections of Leviticus around them deal with prohibited degrees of consanguineous marriage, which the Gentile church has largely forgotten and derived from other sources, and against sacrificing babies to Moloch, which simply isn’t an issue. Moreover, the New Law of grace is fundamentally different in character.

The New Testament makes no such obvious prohibition. Jesus never mentions it. Paul makes two possible references. Romans 1:26-27 has a reference to men and women committing “unnatural acts” with one another as a characteristic of Gentiles without the Law. 1 Corinthians 6:9 also mentions “homosexual offenders,” although from the Greek word used—arsenokoitai—it is less clear, because this word was Greek sex slang in the first century, apparently. A similar word shows up meaning “homosexual” in Greek literature, but it is sufficiently different in spelling and usage to suggest a different shading of meaning.

As historians and theologians have documented, the Church has traditionally considered heterosexual marriage normative and homosexual love and marriage to be exceptional, although it has frequently been tolerated as an exception. This does not have to preclude changes in the doctrine, however; recall that Scripture is very much in favor of slavery, and yet at some point the Christian tradition turned against it, for reasons more traditional and humane than scriptural. Similarly, Protestant churches permit divorce for various reasons, despite the extremely clear New Testament injunction against it in any way, shape, or form. So there is ample precedent for fictive or revised readings of Scripture that emphasize the overall sense of the passages, without taking them out of context—noscitur a sociis, after all—rather than reading them legalistically and out of the context of the passages in which they are found. But regardless of how you look at the New Testament passages, taking them in isolation is both legalistic—which Paul condemns over and over again, and with none of the ambiguity we see here—and theologically vapid, both of which are not parts of how we “do” theology. What is Paul getting at?

1.
Rogers does not take on an easy task for himself. He lays out a hermeneutic of charity, and, using this hermeneutic, lays out sympathetic accounts of the ‘conservative’ and ‘liberal’ positions on homosexual behavior and marriage. The ‘conservative’ account is concerned chiefly with holiness of body, which, to be sure, is an extremely important value. It is part of the way that God deals with us, and it should not be underestimated; moreover, the simplest sense of Scripture is that homosexuality is bad, therefore there should be no homosexuality. The ‘liberal’ acount seems mostly concerned with the language of rights. But the language of rights, for all its value in political and ethical philosophy, doesn’t really have much place in Christian theological discourse. He also assumes that homosexuality exists. This is to say, it is not made up, and it is not a “disease” that must be—or even can be—“cured.” It is not a “lifestyle choice”; people cannot simply choose not to be gay, with or without the help of twelve-step programs. It is a given fact with which we have to deal.

In order to create space in which to talk about homosexuality, Rogers needs to push back against Roman Catholics and Evangelicals, and needs to talk to mainline Protestants who are open to his arguments but expect him to make them and make them well before they will assent. In order to make these pushes, he presents Thomas Aquinas on the one hand, and Karl Barth on the other. This is perfectly proper, since it is hard to find a deeper or better statement of the characteristic natural law theology of the Roman Catholic church than Aquinas, or a deeper or better statement of Evangelical theology than Barth. Furthermore, Rogers is himself a scholar of both, having written a very smart dissertation on their interrelationships which was subsequently published as Thomas Aquinas and Karl Barth: Sacred Doctrine and the Natural Knowledge of God.

Nevertheless, I suspect from language in footnotes that Rogers knows he is going to attract few people even to read his book from churches with a traditional of hierarchical authoritarianism, Biblical fundamentalism, or both. Thus, although he focuses his attention on serious Roman Catholic and Presbyterian thinkers, his audience is clearly more community- and Spirit-oriented churches.

2.
Romans 1:20ff. is an extremely strong passage, but it should get our theological doubts going because it chiefly relies on a “gross-out” argument about Gentiles, and explains that “[a]lthough they know God’s righteous decree that those who do such things deserve death!” Rom. 1:32. How, precisely, do Gentiles without the law know this, except that the Judaizing party at Rome has been pressing it on them? The first sentence of chapter 2 makes the sting: “[y]ou therefore have no excuse!” Following on, Paul makes clear that when he wrote this passage, he was playing into the prejudices of the Judaizing party at Rome, only so that he could hammer them on the other side with virtues like patience and repentance.

Reading Romans 1:20ff. as a condemnation of them is a gross misreading; it is a condemnation of us. The fact is that there are virtually no Christian converts—certainly in the Episcopal Church—who were originally Jews. We thus have a regretable tendency to forget that as Gentiles, we are the ones Paul is making fun of here; we are the ones who are grossing out the Jews. We are the Gentiles who are condemned. But more to the point, it is a caricature, meant to play on the prejudices of the Judaizing party, to show (a) how the Old Law convicts us, and (b) how the New Law sanctifies and justifies us. It may in fact have little if anything to do with Paul’s actual views, but instead have quite a lot to do with the views of the Judaizing party at Rome.

Furthermore, as Rogers points out, Romans 1:27 in the New Revised Standard Version (“NRSV”) uses the term “unnatural relations.” This is a poor translation, and exposes the NRSV for the liberties it takes with the text to compromise with certain doctrinal positions. Similarly, Latin Vulgate Bible, which Thomas was using, was translated by St. Jerome, a notorious prude, and it shows: Jerome's Latin says contra naturam, “against nature,” or "unnatural." But St. Paul’s original Koine Greek read para phusin, which would more properly be translated into Latin as super naturam, “above and beyond nature.” “Against nature” or “unnatural,” in Greek, would have been epi phusin, which Paul chose not to use. This gives us an insight that can be used to fully explain Paul’s concept of what was going on in Leviticus.

In Leviticus, as mentioned above, the prohibition on homosexual sex comes between prohibitions on consanguineous sex and sacrificing babies to Moloch. Both of these can be taken as examples of lust. But if this lust is unnatural—epi phusin—why would it have to be proscribed? After all, human beings are animals, with physical bodies that lust as a matter of “nature.” What is genuinely unnatural, at least in our fallen world, does not have to be prohibited.

One possible way to understand these passages is to say that our spirits are not lustful, but our bodies are. But this seems to take nature as evil; this is Gnosticism. There has to be a better way to understand it. Both Athanasius and Thomas make the move here by saying that we are each one undifferentiated human being, both flesh and spirit, that God wants to save both body and soul, but that nature is fallen; thus death enters into the world. After all, in the Kingdom of Heaven, nature itself will be transformed such that the lion will lay down with the lamb.

This makes it far more difficult for us to make the reasonable—on its face, anyway—inference that homosexuality is “unnatural” because it cannot issue in children. Moreover, in making this type of argument we tend to turn to Aristotle as our paradigmatic authority on “nature,” which seems a little odd when natural science has advanced a bit since then. In another way, certain Orthodox and Anglican ecclesiastics have pointed out a grave shortcomings in the Roman Catholic account of marriage as being primarily about procreation, and the Evangelical Protestant assumption that it is about sublimation and control of lust. To the credit of both persuasions, they also see it as being secondarily about unification of the partners, but even so, it encourages an instrumental view of the other that is ultimately unsacramental and ungraced in character.

The point here is, that the move from nature as it is, to nature as it should be, and inferring homosexuality’s place in the Kingdom of God from that analysis, requires eschatological leaps that the text might not warrant.

3.
The Roman Catholic Church admits the existence of homosexual persons—something most Evangelical churches do not do—and gives a fairly sophisticated natural law account of why homosexuals may not marry, and must be celibate. This account relies at points on some arguments that seem to confuse “fallen” nature and “redeemed” nature a confusion with which Roman Catholic theology in general is shot through. Moreover, it is a confusion that a close reading of Paul, as we just saw, dispels; for what Paul is saying is not that homosexuality is against nature, but is merely more than natural. It’s a quantitative problem, not a qualitative one.

Regardless of its derivation, the argument’s conclusion is that every individual sex act must, in order to be licit, tend both toward (a) the unification of the partners; and (b) be “open” to the procreation of children. Without getting into the nitty-gritty, do we need to assume that therefore a woman who has had a hysterectomy, for example, simply may not marry? Or her marriage, if she is in one, can be annulled? Or must be sexless? Or possibly this is a limitation on the power of God: since Sarah became pregnant long past childbearing years, it is possible for opposite-sex couples to become pregnant at any time, but for gay couples, well, it’s just a little too miraculous. This argument might work for a Catholic, but it should make any Protestant very nervous.

Another way of looking at it that the Roman Catholic Church uses but is also commonly found in Protestant churches (including in Barth) is the doctrine of complementarity. This view, common among the Church Fathers, builds on Genesis 1:27 and 1:28 to say that God’s creating humanity “male and female” and asking them to “be fruitful and multiply” implies complementary roles in society. This is obviously a view we need to be careful with, since can tend toward a retrograde and ultimately unbiblical view of women as defective men. This is not the place for a full exegesis, but we should recall that there is no male or female in Christ, and Paul addresses the women Euodia and Syntyche as clergy in Philippians 4:2-3.

The best way of getting around this is to see reproduction as a communal good. Otherwise, there would be a problem with those who are called to a life of monasticism or even just singleness, because every single person would be called to marry and be fruitful and multiply, even if he or she felt a clear call from God to singleness. Moreover, as Rogers notes, we should note that this language of Genesis doesn’t really tell us much about what happened in Eden, the place where there really was a redeemed nature. In fact, as soon as Adam and Eve get together, they get into mischief. The only thing we know about what is right for them is that it is not good for a man to be alone.

Yet another way of looking at procreation as a communal good, and involving the Trinity in the picture, is to see the Trinity for what it is: a triune God who is entirely self-sufficient with itself. God created the world not because he wanted to create companionship, but as a free act of will. This must be the case, because the Trinity is complete as the interaction of God the Father, Jesus the Word/Creator and, in a gender-bending move, the Mother because “through him all things were created,” and the community provided by the witness of the Holy Spirit. A Trinity that was compelled to create would not be God.

The human marriage covenant can be seen as a type of this Trinitarian union: the Book of Common Prayer prescribes that in addition to the pair to be wed, there also be a priest to officiate and at least two witnesses, who will swear to help uphold the marriage. Thus, like the Trinity, there is a three-part Father-Son-Holy Spirit/Husband-Wife-Community typology going on here. Any coherent pneumatology has to hold that the Holy Spirit is not the Creator—that is the Father—nor is it the hypostasis through which creation occurred—that is the Son—but the celebrator of the love of the Father and the Son, and the sanctifier of creation.

Barth also presents textual problems. Although Barth published two complete commentaries on Romans in his own lifetime, he never addressed the homosexuality issue in his comments on Romans 1, and in fact seems almost unaware the issue exists. Barth’s overall treatment of homosexuality takes up a tiny part of his vast Church Dogmatics—a mere few pages—and is far from thorough. Thus, commenting on his thought, Rogers make the analogy between Barth’s doctrine of Israel and his doctrine of homosexuality. Barth winds up in his work holding that the Jew is an imperfect form of the Christian. This creates a problem, because Barth also needs to work with the text of Romans, where we find out that the Christian is an imperfect form of the Jew, Jewish only by adoption. Barth famously says, “because the election of God is real, there is such a thing as love and marriage.” Thus, Rogers makes Barth say: If Gentile Christians really are engrafted into the tree of life as adopted children of God, then the salvation of the community requires its recognition of marriage equality. Even more than Rogers’ treatment of natural law, this is truly a theological tour de force that must be read to be believed.

Perhaps the best and final objection to the complementarity doctrine stated too strongly and typologically is that it makes Jesus himself a “defective” human, because he never married nor procreated. The doctrine of complementarity is useful in practical pastoral counseling, perhaps, to a point, but it is too easily and too often overstated as a doctrinal theme.

4.
Just for fun, let’s do a thought-experiment with the Book of Ruth. It’s a very short book, but it’s hard to see what the point is; is it historical? Prophetic? Where does it “fit”? Because it’s such a difficult book, it barely appears in the Revised Common Lectionary, but it is an extremely important book, and Ruth appears as one of the few women in the genealogy of Jesus.

We are all familiar with Chapter 1, where Naomi’s husband dies, and her sons marry Ruth and Orpah. Her sons then die, and Naomi orders Ruth and Orpah to go back to their families. But Ruth refuses, saying, “[w]here you go I will go, and where you stay I will stay. Your people will be my people and your God my God. Where you die I will die, and there I will be buried. May the Lord deal with me, be it ever so severely, if anything but death separates you and me.” Ruth 1:16-17. In form and content, this is in essence a marriage vow. What’s more, it historically comes after the Law, not before it. A Christianized Jew, in sneering at the Gentiles as he read Paul's Romans 1, would also be sneering (1) at his own holy book and (2) at Christ himself. It’s a powerful and convicting problem!

After some adventures, Ruth and Naomi attempt to get their kinsman Boaz to impregnate Ruth through subterfuge when he’s drunk, and so that he’d be blacked out and no one else would know. Ruth 3:3-6. Moreover, the text seems equivocal—Naomi explains her rationale that Ruth should have someone to look after her, but Boaz would have no duty to marry a servant girl, although he would have a duty to support the child. Is it a permissible reading here that Ruth and Naomi wanted a child to bring up in their family unit?

It certainly seems so, when we move to Ruth 4:16-17. Naomi brings up Ruth’s and Boaz’s child Obed, and the women say “Naomi has a son.” It’s hard to get over the basic idea here that Ruth and Naomi have formed a family unit, and that Ruth is (most likely) just one of Boaz’s multiple wives. He serves his function, and Naomi and Ruth serve theirs.

Ultimately, the doctrine that marriage has two uses is impoverished. Perhaps in some “natural” sense, it exists only for the satiation of lust and the continuation of the species. But those of us who are part of the Body of Christ aim a bit higher than that. The Kingdom of Heaven, after all, is like a wedding feast; to the oddly single-gender wedding of Father and Son.

Our desire for God, his desire for us, and fundamentally the sexual desire for one another in marriage (properly understood), are all erotic in nature. Telling a person with homosexual desires that those desires are inherently sinful, disregards his humanness, and his resemblance to God; telling him that he may not fulfill his erotic feelings in a marriage denies him the sanctification in the Trinity into the Kingdom of God.

But it also says something about us. If the community of believers is unwilling to participate in the sanctification of a couple, then it is also unwilling to participate in the sanctification of itself. And thus we become nothing more than the caricatures Paul lays out in Romans 1, if we say “no” to God’s invitation to participate in the Trinity and in the sanctifying power of the Holy Spirit; but we can also say “yes”; this is part of what it means to be in the image of God.

5.
So, would I recommend this book? Maybe. It is extremely hard, as this review might imply. It took me weeks to read it, and it took me weeks to write this review in an attempt to do it justice. On the other hand, I’m not sure that it is possible to really understand the conservative theological argument for marriage equality unless you read this bool. Therefore, I would recommend reading it, but only if you’re willing also to put in some time and effort in understanding Aquinas, Barth, and to some degree Rowan Williams, whom Rogers quotes constantly. If you’re not willing, then just read Williams’ short article, “The Body’s Grace.”

Thursday, February 19, 2009

You Can Keep a Good Man Down, But You Can’t Keep Him Out

Book Reviewed:

Graham Greene, The Heart of the Matter. New York: Viking Press (1st Am. Ed., 1948). Currently in print in both hardcover and paperback.

I know an old engineer, who hardly does any engineering anymore, who makes a wonderful expert witness. He expertly evades potentially difficult cross-examination with a folksy wave of his hand and says that he’s “too old to remember anything but the truth anymore.” Thereafter any cross-examination he faces looks like hectoring, rather than valid attempts to impeach. The main character of this book would have been much better off if he’d had a little worse memory.

Reviewers repeat ad nauseam the fact that Graham Greene divided the novels he wrote into serious literary novels and what he called ‘entertainments.’ Today, as you might expect, some of his entertainments are more highly respected than some of his literary novels. Which group any given novel fell into seems to have been based on consideration of two things: religiosity and lugubriousness. The more of either or both the novel displayed, the more ‘serious’ he seems to have classed it.

The Heart of the Matter certainly falls, both by Greene’s criteria and any we might care to apply, into the category of a serious literary novel. It concerns the later career of Major Henry Scobie, deputy chief of police in the capital city of an unnamed British West African colony during World War II. Major Scobie, in middle age, is unhappily married to Louise, a deeply Catholic woman. They have lived in this colony for 15 years, as Scobie has worked his way up the ladder through careful, honest, and blameless police work. It is made clear that Louise is depressed because, years before, their daughter had died as a child, and that she fancies herself an intellectual, reading poetry and desiring intellectual conversation, which she cannot find in the colony. When the colony’s commissioner of police retires and Scobie is passed over as too old for the job, the sadness and depression between the two of them becomes too much for either of them to bear, and something needs to break.

This is the beginning of the true story of the book: Scobie’s descent from grace to damnation. Louise has begun an affair with a new man in the colony, who coincidentally is supposed to investigate police misconduct, and therefore conceives of himself as Scobie’s antagonist. Nevertheless, Louise wants to leave, and Scobie resolves to send her to South Africa, where she knows people. But he cannot raise the funds, so he goes into debt to Yusef, who is decidedly the wrong sort of person. Then he finds a contraband letter in a ship that he is searching for smuggled diamonds. Instead of sending it to MI-5 and the cryptographers without opening it, as he is supposed to do, he opens it and finds that it is a letter to the captain’s daughter. So he burns it, rather than reporting the man. Then once his wife is gone, he falls in love with a shipwreck victim thirty years his junior, and begins an affair. And ever so slowly, he descends...

From a critical standpoint, the novel suffers from a couple of flaws. The first is that it is painfully lugubrious. Greene’s humor at the best of times is Atacama-dry, see for instance The Quiet American, but in this novel it is virtually nonexistent. I have difficulty summoning to memory a single instance that could even be seriously called ironical. This story lends itself to a certain amount of irony, if not levity, so I would call that a flaw.

Another fairly major flaw is that the characterization of women in the story is consistently weak. As a flaw, however, this is somewhat smaller. Although the story is told in the third person, it is not an omniscient third person, but instead is told from Scobie’s point of view, and it seems that Scobie himself does not have an accurate or even particularly well developed picture of the psychology of the people around him.

Michael Campbell’s description from The Sun Also Rises of how one goes bankrupt—“gradually, then suddenly”—seems to apply equally well to Scobie’s descent. After a lovers’ quarrel with his lover Helen, Scobie writes her a letter explaining his true feelings, which she never receives. He reassures her that he loves her and will never leave her alone, regardless of what might happen. Upon returning to his house after this conversation and finding out that she never received the letter, Scobie finds a telegram from his wife telling him she is returning from South Africa.

Thus Scobie has a problem: he is a Roman Catholic, and so his marriage, to him, is an unbreakable bond. Although his marriage leaves quite a bit to be desired, and he is in love with Helen—to the extent he is capable of loving at all—he cannot leave Louise. And so he finds himself on the horns of a dilemma: he has promised to protect the happiness of two women, but his protecting the happiness of the one precludes his protecting the other.

Then Yusef asks him for something. The very same sea captain whose letter Scobie had burned is coming to port again. Yusef asks Scobie to deliver a package to the captain without opening it. At first Scobie refuses; then Yusef produces the letter that Scobie had written to Helen, but which had been inexplicably lost. Yusef points out that it would be very tragic if Mrs. Scobie were to get the letter as soon as she was off her ship. And so Scobie delivers the package. This time, in a counterpoint to his opening the captain’s letter, he delivers it unopened.

The next day, Scobie’s servant Ali, who has been faithful to Scobie for 15 years, catches a young boy who is Yusef’s servant sneaking into Scobie’s house. Scobie takes the boy aside and finds that the boy is trying to give him a smuggled diamond. Ali sees. Later, Scobie goes to see Yusef and give him a piece of his mind, and Scobie lets slip that he might no longer trust Ali, now that he himself is not trustworthy; and Yusef promises to have the problem taken care of. On the way home, Scobie walks past Ali’s body, with his throat slit.

The climactic scene comes after this, when Scobie’s wife insists he go to mass with her. In keeping with traditional Catholic doctrine, one must be in a state of grace, that is, have no mortal sins on his conscience, in order to take the sacrament. Since Scobie now has both a murder and adultery on his conscience, he must go to confession in order to be absolved, and therefore to be in the requisite state of grace to take the sacrament. When he goes to the confessional, he confesses his sin of adultery. But when the priest asks him whether he can permanently abjure the sin, he admits that he cannot; and thus the priest refuses to absolve him, because even God cannot absolve someone who is not penitent.

And thus, in the most moving scene of the book, Scobie takes the sacrament in a state of mortal sin, damning himself in his own mind.

Shortly thereafter, Scobie finds out that the powers that be have changed their minds, and he is to be made police commissioner. He has taken on irreconcilable responsibilities and done unforgivable acts: he has violated the very laws he promised to enforce by in effect having his servant killed, he has taken on irreconcilable obligations to two different women, and he has eaten his Savior in a state of mortal sin.

The character flaw that Scobie exhibits is a certain type of taking himself too seriously. He conceives of himself as having responsibility for the people around him—he is a classic guardian personality type. But in doing so, he takes on the responsibility of creating a better world for the people around him than really exists. This is what lying is all about. Social life would be impossible without small lies and evasions—this is what we call politeness and tact—but those small lies actually tell a larger truth. They do not represent an attempt to create an alternate reality.

But there is another type of lie that requires the construction of a vast interlocking web of lies; it involves the creation of a complete alternate reality from one’s own imagination. It is an incredible act of creation, on par with God’s own! But it also involves a denial of the reality that God has actually created. It involves a statement that “I can create a better reality than reality itself; and indeed I will do so, and support it with a vast web of lies, a complete creation, in rejection of you, God.”

Eventually this gives rise to the “ultimate no.” Scobie’s progressive refusal of reality and desire to hold up the world like Atlas by creating separate realities for each of the people he has taken on responsibility for, leads inexorably to his saying the ultimate no: he kills himself. And even in doing so, he creates an alternate reality. Throughout the book, he makes small entries in his diary about what he did that day. In order to make it appear that he did not commit suicide, in order to spare Louise and Helen, he makes counterfeit entries claiming that he has angina pectoris. Thus he has in every respect uttered the ultimate no.

Without ruining the ending too far, it is important to remember that God will not be denied. Not all is lost that seems lost, and God looks out for those marked as his own.

Monday, February 16, 2009

How To Be A Honky

Movie Reviewed:

Gran Torino, 2008 (R). Directed by Clint Eastwood. Starring Clint Eastwood, Christopher Carley, Bee Vang, and Ahney Her.

As director of himself, Clint Eastwood has made three great movies: Unforgiven (1992), Million Dollar Baby (2004), and now Gran Torino. Each has been preoccupied with similar questions of how to be an adult. This presents a really serious and important question. There has been a growing preoccupation with people in their 50s and 60s acting like infants. And anyone who’s read some of our “best” current literary authors—Philip Roth comes to mind—can quickly get the impression that even entry into senescence, a time historically understood as being for reflection, teaching, and finishing up the work of a life, is mainly about “oh shit! I’m gonna die! And my dick don’t work like it used to!” In short, there’s not a lot else out there.

Gran Torino opens with a scene of Walter Kowalski (Eastwood) standing next to the coffin of his wife, as his sons sit in a pew making snarky comments about “the old man.” Meanwhile, the grandson and granddaughter fight it out, despite being obviously too old to be doing such things in church (the granddaughter later reveals herself to be in the 16-18 age range). The granddaughter has multiple piercings, and sports a bare midriff with a navel ring at her grandmother’s funeral mass. Meanwhile, Eastwood’s craggy face contorts into a more and more pronounced sneer, and a growl grows in the back of his throat. The scene closes with him sitting down in a pew, and a young, pasty-faced, red-haired priest (Christopher Carley) giving a stereotypically banal homily.

Returning to his well-kept two-storey home in a stereotypical 50s-60s vintage working-class neighborhood, we’re introduced to the second major conflict of the book, when Father Janovich, he of the painfully banal homily, asks Walter to confess. He presents this as Walter’s wife’s last wish. Walter snarlingly demurs. Walter sneers to himself as his son drives away in his giant Toyota SUV: “Would it kill ya to buy American?”

Then the third and central conflict of the book comes into play. Walter’s home is in a changing, and now largely ethnic neighborhood, in what is understood to be Detroit, although that is never explicitly stated. It is important to note that Walter’s surname is Kowalski; this has always been an ethnic neighborhood. It’s just that the ethnicity is changing. Walter’s next-door neighbor Thao (Bee Vang), a child of Hmong refugees, is presented as an introverted, nerdy kid. In his introductory scenes, he is threatened by an Hispanic street gang, driving a classic pimped-out General Motors muscle sedan. In swoops an Asian street gang in a late-90s model Honda Civic with a huge spoiler, a Folger’s-can muffler, and a hood that is the color of primer-over-bondo. The Hispanics in the GM flash a revolver, the Asians in the Honda flash an uzi, and the GM drives away. Thao is momentarily saved.

But Thao really only has a tiger by the tail. The Asian gang goes to his home next door to Walter’s and begins harassing him to join their gang, abusing his sister Sue (Ahney Her). They trespass onto Walter’s beautifully kept lawn, and he yells at them to get off, go home, and leave Thao and Sue alone, explaining politely at one point that if they don’t, “I blow a hole in your face and then I go in the house... and I sleep like a baby. You can count on that. We used to stack fucks like you five feet high in Korea... use you for sandbags.”

Nevertheless, the Asian gang gets to Thao, and they talk him into joining the gang. His initiation is to steal Walter’s prized Gran Torino, that he had installed the steering column on, all the way back in 1972.

Now, it’s important to realize what a Gran Torino is, or was. In 1972, Ford redesigned its Torino line of mid-size coupes and sedans. The most sporty was the Gran Torino Sport, with the SportRoof (i.e., fastback). It had an oval air intake with an egg-crate grille, designed to look like the mouth of a whale. The “performance” engine was the 351-cubic inch (5.8-liter) CobraJet 32-valve V8, developing 266 SAE-net horsepower.[1] By the standards of the year before, it was tepid. The ’71 Gran Torino was available with a 429-cubic inch (7.0-liter) 32-valve V8, developing somewhere around 375 SAE-gross horsepower. But the ’72 was still one of the most powerful, sporty cars out there. And it was available with power steering, power brakes, front disc brakes, and either a four-on-the-floor or a four-speed CruiseMatic automatic transmission.

This is Walt’s car, and his prized possession. Walt catches Thao trying to steal it, and nearly shoots him with his M1 rifle (a beautiful, well-oiled, bolt-action weapon). Thao’s sister and mother then make Thao do work for Walter. This sets off an ongoing conversation in which Walter starts teaching Thao how to take care of a home. Walter gets Thao a job with a construction crew, buys him tools, and shows him how to use them. Walter shows Thao how to talk “like a man,” in the hilarious exchange behind this link.

Walter’s conception of what it means to be a man is probably the real subject of the movie. It would be easy to get the idea, watching the movie, that Walter’s conception of what it means to be a man has a lot to do with drinking, tobacco use, and copious use of ethnic slurs. But this would be a category error—mistaking the accidental for the essential. His conception really has a lot to do with hard work and keeping things up and caring about those around you. It’s cool to watch him find this core of himself, and to teach it to Thao.

I won’t bother spoiling the ending, or any more of the moments on the way there, except to say that the ending was a bit of a surprise, but the trip there was probably more fun than the ending. If you’re not easily offended by copious and unnecessary use of ethnic slurs, you will probably like it. It’s what people will call “serious,” but I laughed. A lot. So... take that for what it’s worth.

[1] A note on SAE-gross versus SAE-net. Between the 1971 and 1972 model years, the Society of Automotive Engineers (“SAE”) changed its testing regimen for new engines. Under the pre-1972 gross test, engines were tested without mufflers or accessories such as air conditioners, power steering pumps, break pumps, and sometimes even water pumps. Even so, many engines were purposely underrated in order to assuage insurance companies; for instance, the 1971 Ford CobraJet 429-cubic inch engine was rated at 325 horsepower, but likely put out more like 375-400 gross horsepower. From 1972 on, the power was measured with a full exhaust system, full emissions control system (including catalytic converter), and all accessories, including A/C, power steering, power brakes, etc. So the 1972 CobraJet 351 likely put out something close to 325 horsepower on a gross test, despite being rated for 266 on the net test.

Monday, February 9, 2009

Evelyn Waugh on the Potomac

Books Reviewed:

Christopher Buckley, Boomsday.  New York: Twelve Books (2007).  Paperback, $13.99.

Christopher Buckley, Supreme Courtship.  New York: Twelve Books (2008).  Hardcover, $24.99.

Evelyn Waugh, Scoop.  Boston: Back Bay Books (1999; originally published 1938).  Paperback, $14.99.

Evelyn Waugh, Vile Bodies.  Boston: Back Bay Books (1999; originally published 1930).  Paperback, $14.99.

Among the 20- and 30-something crowd inside the Beltway, references to Christopher T. Buckley’s newest two novels, Boomsday and Supreme Courtship, are casually thrown out in cocktail-party conversation.  His work is well-known among the newly ascendant anti-stupidity cohort of bright young things that have come to Washington—more accurately, come out of the woodwork; many were already here—to serve as bureaucrats, attorneys, K Streeters, and itinerant party hacks in the new administration.

Mr. Buckley has found himself recently as one of the finest columnists at The Daily Beast, a new web-zine edited by former New Yorker editor Tina Brown.  If his own testimony is to be believed, he was ousted from his position as the back page columnist for the National Review, the magazine his father founded, for a certain lack of ideological purity: he endorsed Barack Obama.  He—again, by his account—offered his resignation from the NR, never expecting that it would be accepted, much less that he’d be essentially sacked, but it was accepted as soon as it was offered. If he actually had an office at the NR offices, it would not surprise me to find out that his affects were in a box outside when he got back from lunch.

As a bit of an aside, his explanation of his choice to endorse Obama sounds completely consistent with what many normally conservative people said late last summer and last fall: “What happened to the McCain I used to know and understand?” “How much of an insult to my intelligence is this Palin woman?” “I’m college-educated—I just can’t bring myself to vote for someone that evidently dumb!” “I can’t believe that Rush Limbaugh has done what the North Vietnamese couldn’t: taken McCain’s integrity.” For these people, Obama’s remark that “I’m not against wars—I’m against dumb wars” was what really sealed the deal. It’s no surprise that the intelligentsia voted for Obama, even when they disagreed with him. The Republican Party, for better or worse, has gained a reputation as the “stupid party,” that can’t even read a balance sheet.

1.
Be all that as it may, Buckley has managed to come out with two excellent satirical novels in the past two years. The plot of Boomsday, published in 2007, revolves around a love affair-cum-political affair between Cassandra Devine, a late-20s junior associate in a PR firm in DC, and Randy “not quite Jefferson” Jepperson, an upper-crusty WASP sometime-playboy senator from Massachusetts. Cass has some serious Ayn Rand-fueled rage about the fact that the Baby Boomers are beginning to retire—this is “Boomsday,” and in the real world Boomers will start turning 65 on January 1, 2011—and that they are the “most selfish generation.” Whether they are the most selfish in the history of the world is questionable—certain eras of the ancien regime, Sodom and Gomorrah, and the later, more decadent years of Rome come to mind—but there’s probably, again in the real world, an excellent case to be made that they are the most selfish American generation. She blogs about this under the not-really-pseudonym Cassandra (if you don’t know who this is, break out your Edith Hamilton. Or, if you don’t know who that is, log onto your Wikipedia. And find out who it is, then look up Cassandra. Or you could just look up Cassandra on Wikipedia. Your choice.)

Randy is basically interested in two things: getting into the White House, and getting laid. Perhaps getting laid in the White House would beat both in his mind, but he’s too well-bred to get carried away. His original association with Cass is that she drove a Hum-vee (this is what the military calls what we poor civilians call a “Hummer H-1-alpha) that he commandeered from her in order to grab lunch in a Bosnian village while on a “fact-finding mission.” After a chase with locals, he drove it into a mine-field and blew them both up. Of course, the rumor is that they were found in, shall we say, a compromising position. The rumor is false.

The way the two get together is that Cass calls on under-30s to picket gated communities, golf courses, and the like; this leads to various under-30s attacking gated communities, golf courses, and the like; and this leads to her being arrested for incitement. Randy smells publicity, notices that he knows her, and gets involved. Cass proposes something called “voluntary transitioning”: if people commit suicide at age 70, they and their children will enjoy tax perks. This plan would solve the budgetary problem caused by boomers’ retirement.

Of course, this drags out of the woodwork various wackos, including an obvious Pat Robertson/Jerry Falwell stand-in and a money-grubbing Catholic priest having a vague mutual respect and definite alliance over pro-life issues; Cass’s father, who through financial management had not been able to send Cass to college (this is why she was driving a Hum-vee), but has since become a fabulously wealthy dot-com entrepreneur, and between whom and Cass there is no lost love; and a (fairly obviously Republican) president of conventional sensibilities and a mouth reminiscent of LBJ; Cass’s boss, Terry; and the president’s chief factotum Bucky, who is a poor, overworked, and over-ulcered man.

During the course of the book, a variety of increasingly hilarious hijinks[1] ensue. There is a lawyer whose fee, it is emphasized over and over again (presumably) for comedic effect, is $700 an hour; but this is more than a little silly to anyone familiar with the rates of top DC lawyers, which usually start at $800-$1,000 an hour, and will sometimes get into the close-to-$1,500-an-hour range.

But I suspect that this was all a lot funnier when it was written in 2006 and published in 2007. The ongoing issue in the novel is a massive credit crisis, featuring inflation, a crazed Federal Reserve, stagflation, unemployment, and a decision by the Banks of China and Japan to stop buying American debt; this is the trigger that makes Cass’s views so important. In short, Cass is saying, our parents are trying to get a credit card that has its bill sent to us.

The problem is that this is precisely what our parents have been doing since the late 1970s. There are two prongs to this: the public prong, and the private prong. The public prong begins in the early 1980s. The concept was that there was something called the Laffer Curve. The Laffer Curve idea posited that there was an optimal tax level for revenue-generation purposes. If your tax rate was lower than this, you generated less revenue than you could, for obvious reasons (which was OK as long as you had as much as you needed, since leaving more of their money to people is a prima facie “good” thing.) Similarly, if your tax rate was higher than this, you generated less revenue than you could, because there would be less of an incentive to make more money (which was not OK, because not only was it dumb, it just seems prima facie “bad” to take more money from people through taxes than you have to.) Reagan posited that we were on the wrong side of this curve, and proposed a tax cut, and said that it would be at worst essentially revenue-neutral. The evidence is that he was wrong, and it wasn’t.

Bush pere and Clinton, both being part of the reality-based, non-stupid community of people, took a look at this and realized that they needed to raise taxes and cut spending in order to stop the financial bleeding. They did this. They stopped the bleeding.

But within the looneyest pro-business/Grover Norquist fringes of the Republican Party, there lived on a theory that actually the Laffer Curve concept only applies across generations. The theory is this: The government can run an indefinite deficit now, but that foregone tax money will grow a lot more by being in the private economy than if it were being taken in by the government and spent by the government, i.e., private individuals are a lot smarter about how that money would be spent than the government is. They are so much smarter, in fact, that these deficits can be covered by borrowed money today and paid back by future generations, which will be so much richer because of the difference between how the money would be spent by private individuals than by the government that they will be able to pay it as though it were a mere bagatelle.

The problems with this theory are so many that it is almost embarrassing. All of the money the government takes in is eventually—actually, in quite short order—sent back out in outlays either for payrolls or for goods and services. So even supposing the government is dumber than private individuals are—and recent events on Wall Street bring that basic proposition into some doubt—there is not nearly the spread that this theory supposes, since the money goes back into the private sector anyway. And let’s not forget interest rates; the reason we charge interest is so that that growth will be captured in how much will be paid back later on. Now, maybe the government gets such a low interest rate that it wins when it borrows money. But still, the spread is reduced.

Perhaps the best part of this theory, though, is that it is completely untestable. By the time it can be empirically tested, it will be decades from now. And the old Laffer Curve theory could be tested within a couple of years, which meant it might be disproved, or we might at least know where we are on the curve! The NEW theory is so much better. And on it, in large part, Bush fil ran for President. He won, and put it into action. I don’t meant to dump on Bush fil; my feeling is that he is a decent, well-intentioned man who unfortunately isn’t terribly intelligent and was put into a difficult position. But part of being President is knowing whom to listen to, and he clearly did not know.

And so it shouldn’t surprise us that on the private side, our parents’ generation made the same mistakes of assuming there would always be growth, wages would always (and not just in the long run; unfailingly) go up, and that assets would always rise in value. Which, coupled with stagnation or slight decline in the median wage—which, again, everyone had always assumed would always go up, because since the early 1930s, anyway, it always had—made Boomers overspend, overborrow, undersave, and put us into an unsustainable economic position, for which we are starting to pay the price.

Ever heard of post-war Austerity Britain? I’m sensing that’s the way most of the rest of my life (and my generation of Americans’) is going to be.

2.
Which brings us to Vile Bodies, which takes place some twenty years before Austerity Britain, but exhibits some similarities. This, Waugh’s second novel, is also one of the weakest I have read (I have not read all of them, but have read most). In fact, the plot is essentially non-existent: it is a series of sketches of odd events that occur to Adam Fenwick-Symes in his quest to scrape together enough money to marry his beloved Nina. A variety of other interesting characters make their ways through the novel, including Mrs. Ape and her traveling evangelical angels, Fr. Rothschild, S.J. (interesting, no? that Protestant and Papist people of the cloth should show up in both novels?), a man who clearly knows what’s going on but isn’t letting on, and Miss Agatha Runcible, a drunken party-girl, and Lottie, an absent-minded sot of an Edwardian landlady.

For Vile Bodies, it seems, the method is the message. Which is to say, that the disconcerting, quick, seemingly unconnected scenes are meant to convey part of the meaning of the story. A partying lifestyle, while on a Depression-era budget, presents something of a problem. Moreover, the attempt to marry the lovely Nina, whose father is one of those between-the-wars Englishmen who is a bit short on money but recalls not being short, and affects a military persona—he calls himself a Colonel—and acts absurdly and vainly, even while upbraiding Adam for his efforts.

This is, to put it bluntly, one of Waugh’s lesser efforts and should only be read by committed Wauvians.

3.
The underlying connection between Buckley and Waugh lies in Waugh’s novel Scoop. Scoop concerns the adventures of William Boot, a young man with a country estate where he lives in comfortable poverty (a status that was apparently at least theoretically possible at that time) and writes a weekly nature column for The Daily Beast, a London tabloid newspaper (see the connection now?) When the Beast needs a foreign correspondent to cover a civil war in a nonexistent African country (which is a thinly disguised Ethiopia), it decides to tap a well-known young writer of smutty novels named—surprise!—William Boot. As could be predicted from such a set-up, the wrong William Boot gets hired, who through sheer old-fashioned country English pluck pulls off a scoop that all of the other journalists with their London cunning, who are mostly making up their stories, are unable to get. At the end of the story, everything gets sorted out at the low levels of the Daily Beast’s organization, but the higher-ups are allowed to continue to believe what they want to believe. And everyone goes home and lives happily ever after.

The plot of Scoop is almost irrelevant. It’s cutesy, and it doesn’t mean much. It’s funny and has a nice moral about being honest, hard-working, and so forth. Quite pleasant. But the language Waugh uses, and the light, airy vibe the writing gives, are untouchable. The tiny touches, such as “The Stitch Service,” a cabinet minister named Algernon Stitch, and such other graceful felicities make the book a joy.

The verdict: if you’re into Waugh, you will like this novel. If you are into Wodehouse, you will like this novel. If you are into Powell, you will like this novel. If you liked Brideshead Revisited, you might not like this novel. This is what Waugh was good at. Brideshead Revisited represents a poor attempt to write like Graham Greene, and Waugh was not Graham Greene; he was himself. Scoop is his best novel. Read it.

4.
This leads us to the fourth and final part of this (admittedly rather long-form) review: Supreme Courtship. This is a far shorter and lighter novel than Boomsday, and is consequently a lot funnier but deals with far less pressing issues. The basic premise is that Judge Judy gets named to the Supreme Court. OK, it’s actually a bit more complicated than that. There is a president who is a down-to-earth, decent midwestern guy whom Congress consequently hates. A Supreme Court justice needs to step down, after his dementia quickens from a canter to a gallop. The chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee wants to be appointed, but the President can’t stand him. So when the President nominates two upstanding and brilliant jurists, the Senator shoots them down on the flimsiest of pretexts.

Then the President has the brainstorm of nominating a smart, sassy (need I add sexy?) Texan to the Supreme Court, who, incidentally, has been the star of a TV court show since a Hollywood producer, incidentally her husband, fell in love with her (in every sense of the phrase) when she was a Superior Court judge in Los Angeles County, California. Her popularity ratings, needless to say, are significantly higher than the chairman of the Judiciary Committee’s, and after some hilarity, she sails through the nomination process.

The scenes that follow, with absurd uses of late Latin legalese and even more absurd fact patterns, will have lawyers rolling on the floor but will probably at least amuse anyone. They are the true core of the book.

There is, as you might expect from a Buckley book and from the title, a romance. However, it is fairly perfunctory and seems almost tacked on to the main plot. I think, as readers, we are willing to accept this in exchange for the pleasure of the pun in the title and the hilarious exchanges in the book.

The end result is that this is a pleasant, hilarious, light, and generally non-topical book. Well, at least not yet. Justice Ginsburg is now sick with pancreatic cancer, and, well, no one gets better from pancreatic cancer. It just doesn’t happen. John Paul Stevens is 88. Heck, he was appointed by Nixon! Amusingly, when he was appointed, he was a conservative. His views haven’t changed much. I think this shows us where we’ve gone in the meantime. David Souter wants to return to New Hampshire, and, in all fairness, I can understand wanting to do some fly fishing and writing before he keels over on the bench. So, I suspect that this novel, like Boomsday, might find itself becoming more topical as it goes on. It’s fascinating, at times, how life follows art, and what’s over-the-top satire today is tomorrow’s political and social fact.



[1] My copy of MS-Word, on which this is being written, does not register “hijinks” as a word. I’d like it to be known that Microsoft does not believe in hijinks—it’s so poetical.